



Process, Strategy, and Contextual: The Deadlock Situation in The Negotiation for Resolving Conflict Between Russia and Ukraine (2022-2025)

Dedi Yusuf¹, R. Widya Setiabudi Sumadinata², Akim³

¹²³Universitas Padjadjaran, Indonesia

Correspondent: dedi23001@mail.unpad.ac.id¹

Received : November 21, 2025

Accepted : December 23, 2025

Published : January 31, 2026

Citation: Yusuf, D., Sumadinata, R.W.S., & Akim, (2026). Process, Strategy, and Contextual: The Deadlock Situation in The Negotiation for Resolving Conflict Between Russia and Ukraine (2022-2025). Ilomata International Journal of Social Science, 7(1), 330-345.

<https://doi.org/10.61194/ijss.v7i1.2046>

ABSTRACT: The conflict between Russia and Ukraine escalated into a full-scale war following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since then, both parties have engaged in several negotiation efforts aimed at resolving the conflict. However, from all those negotiations conducted none of them produce any agreement or any framework to resolve the conflict. This is seen by the researcher as a deadlocked situation within the negotiation. By using qualitative descriptive research with document analysis using Faure's deadlock within negotiation framework, this research indicates that negotiation between Russia and Ukraine for resolving their conflict has reached a deadlocked situation. This research also found that several factors such as process, strategy, and contextual factor that are contributing to the deadlock situation within the negotiation. The findings suggest that these factors are creating a condition where during negotiations strategies adopted by both countries during negotiation and social, political, and legal pressure from within the countries makes them have very little maneuver during the negotiation, which creates a lack of any substantial agreement from the negotiation to resolve the conflict. This research contributes to the limited amount of discourse regarding the negotiation conditions that occurred between Russia and Ukraine for resolving their conflict, offering a new perspective by applying Faure's indicators and factors such as Process, Strategy, and Contextual towards this issue.

Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, War, Negotiation, Deadlock.



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INTRODUCTION

After years of tension and conflict between Russia and Ukraine, there was a large-scale invasion on February 24, 2022 done by Russian military forces into Ukrainian territory with the troops crossing into Ukraine. President of Russia Vladimir Putin stated during the start of the invasion that Russia is doing the military operation to protect the Russian speaking communities within Ukraine, such as Donbas and also for the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine ([Knott, 2023](#)). This invasion was then followed by an annexation attempt, where in late September 2022, Russia signed an annexation agreement recognizing four Donbas region consists of Luhansk, Khreson, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk as part of the territory belong to Russia ([Megoran, 2024](#)).

This conflict creates massive casualties from both countries. Between 2022 and 2025, it is estimated that approximately 70,000 Ukrainian soldiers were killed and over 140,000 were wounded in combat. ([Lawry et al., 2025](#)). On the other side, around more than 250 thousand Russian troops have been killed due to the war ([Sauer, 2025](#)). In addition, there are also casualties from civilians living in Ukraine, where based on data from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission (HRMMU) in Ukraine, currently around 12 thousand citizens from Ukraine have been killed and 29 thousand people have been injured due to the war ([Gunawan & Prasetyo, 2025](#)).

This conflict not only affects the two countries, but also globally. The war between Russia and Ukraine has a direct impact on global food instability and also global energy stability. On one side, the invasion has made it impossible for both countries to meet global food commodities. It is estimated that Russia and Ukraine are one of the biggest suppliers to the global food market and accounted for around 12% of global food trade between 2019 and 2025 ([Hellegers, 2022](#)). The invasion has stalled most food exports from Ukraine, such as wheat. This was further worsened when Russia blockaded the Black Sea port in Ukraine, which is one of the largest places for Ukraine to export its commodities, including food commodities ([Neik et al., 2023](#)). This resulted in disruptions to the food commodity supply chain, which triggered price increases globally. On the other side, Russia is a major supplier of natural gas, coal, and energy to European countries. In 2021, Russia is estimated to supply 157 billion cubic meters of gas to the European Union, which is about 43% of the total gas imported by EU countries ([Keliauskaite et al., 2025](#)). When the war started, it disrupted critical energy infrastructure, leading to a decrease in the flow of natural gas and energy to European countries that are heavily dependent on Russian exports ([Zhang et al., 2024](#)). Then, the sanctions imposed by the European Union on Russian oil imports from the sea have also changed the global energy trade. This has led to an increase in energy prices and instability in the international energy market.

During the ongoing conflict, there have been several attempts by both countries to resolved it. However, the result is minimal and until 2025, there have not been any framework agreed upon by both parties to resolve the conflict. Based on this situation, this article argues that the negotiation between Russia and Ukraine has reached a deadlocked situation. Deadlock, defined by Dean G. Pruitt is a situation where neither party appears to be willing or able to give in ([Pruitt, 1981](#)). This definition also aligned with Guy Olivier Faure concept of deadlock situation within negotiation where he defined deadlock as a situation that occurs when neither party involved in the negotiation can make any concessions or steps that can trigger the dynamics of the negotiation, either actions or words ([Faure, 2005](#)).

Based on this understanding, this research produced a central question: What factors have caused the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine reach a deadlocked situation? The answer of those statements above will provide research significance practically and theoretically. Practically, a deepened understanding of this problem can give more insight for those involved in negotiations between both countries or even third-party for more effective strategies to break the deadlock and formulate an agreement for Russia and Ukraine to resolve their conflict. Theoretically, the exploration of the Russia and Ukraine situation within their negotiation based on a new perspective approach will results an increasing academic discourse for the issue.

There are a few studies that discussed the situation within Russia and Ukraine negotiation for conflict resolution. Scholar such as Kristian Atland (2024) discusses the problem within negotiation between Russia and Ukraine in 2014-2015 which resulted with Minsk Agreement that never fully implemented by both Russia and Ukraine and failed to resolved the conflict ([Atland, 2024](#)). He argues that the implementation of the agreement is failing due to mistrust between both parties, too many ambiguities within the agreement, and pressure from western countries for Ukraine to sign the agreement, which resulted in Ukraine more hesitant and unwilling to implement it. Therefore, he argues that Minsk Agreement a tool of Russian leverage rather than a real peace process where Ukraine agreed under military pressure with little alternative, while Russia used diplomacy alongside war to secure concessions.

The other research done by Isabel Bramsen and Isak Svensson (2024) discussed the possibilities and challenges of negotiating peace in the Russia-Ukraine war, focusing on when peace talks could realistically happen, who should be involved, and how negotiations might be structured ([Bramsen & Svensson, 2024](#)). They argued that currently neither Russia nor Ukraine sees the other as a legitimate negotiation partner. This caused the lack of results within the negotiation, and they added that a stalemate or external pressure could push the negotiation talks forward. They also suggest that future negotiations may require several elements such as multilateral frameworks, involvement of Russia, and greater inclusivity to ensure legitimacy.

One of the few works which directly addressed regarding the cause of failure and lack of substantive result within negotiation from Russia and Ukraine is by Anna Batta (2024), which suggest that negotiations before the invasion started at 2022 were at a standstill because both parties have different interpretation of the conflict and different perception on how they resolve the conflict ([Batta, 2024](#)). Also, she added that at the current invasion time, both parties did not consider the present time as an opportune time to negotiate, especially for Ukraine which would lose much of its territories in the occupied east and south region. This resulted in lack of concessions and therefore lack of result within the current negotiation.

The literature review above suggests that the reason the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine did not produce any substantive agreement to resolve the conflict is mostly due to both countries mistrust, did not see each other as legitimate negotiation partners, and not considering current time as opportune time to negotiate. However, this research argues that there are several more factors contribute to the reason negotiation between Russia and Ukraine has reached a deadlocked situation that did not discussed within the previous studies. Also, there is not any studies regarding the negotiation from a perspective that the negotiation is not in a failed situation, but in a deadlocked situation, which will be explained in this research.

Therefore, this research takes a position among the previous existing literature by offering an alternative explanation by giving on several factors that creates the deadlocked situation itself within the negotiation between Russia and Ukraine that happens since the conflict escalates into full-scale war in 2022. The novelty of the research lies in using Faure's indicators and factors such as process, contextual, and strategy to analyze the deadlocked situation within Russia and Ukraine negotiations for their conflict resolution. This research use of Faure indicators, factors, and strategy to overcome the deadlocked situation within Russia and Ukraine negotiation for conflict

resolution has not been done by previous studies, which fills the gap in the literature of research related to situation within negotiation between Russia and Ukraine for conflict resolution, but also expand the discourse surrounding the issue.

Studies on the negotiation between Russia and Ukraine for their conflict resolution is still limited, with some researchers only focusing on past negotiation agreements which ended in failure such as Minsk Agreement and analyze a few reasons why the current negotiation fails. This research filled the gap in the literature by analyzing the deadlock using Faure's framework in the Russia and Ukraine negotiations. Using this approach this research identifies several factors that contribute to the deadlock within the negotiation itself which can help on understanding why negotiations between Russia and Ukraine is still on a deadlocked situation till right now, where there is no substantial concession or agreement for a framework to resolve conflict between both countries and also providing strategies to overcome those deadlocked negotiations.

METHOD

This study uses a qualitative approach. It is a descriptive study using document analysis as the main data collection technique, where the data that will be taken and used in this research is data in the form of news, official statements, and journal articles discussing the negotiation from both countries from 2022 to 2025 ([Fadli, 2021](#)). The researcher will also use secondary data sources that already exist and are created by previous researchers who have discussed the research topic which can appear in the form of written documents such as journals, academic literature, articles, books, and news ([Gronmo, 2020](#)). For this research, Faure's indicators and factors were employed as analytical coding to show the negotiation is deadlocked and several factors such as process, contextual, and strategies contribute to the deadlocked situation. From this analysis, the author interpret data on research that is not only intended for description alone, but will also try to explain by developing further analysis of the general description of the research using the theory framework related to the case.

The theoretical framework that will be used by the author is the one developed by Guy Olivier Faure about the deadlocked situation within a negotiation. Faure identifies several indicators that indicates the negotiation is in a deadlocked situation and also several factors that create the deadlock situation itself. Faure stated that there are four indicators that indicates the negotiation is in a deadlocked situation ([Faure, 2005](#)). First is when the meeting between the two parties lacks substance where no real steps are taken, such as concessions, exchange of information, or giving of advice that occurs in the negotiation. Second is that the answers given by the parties involved in the negotiation are so complicated that they become completely incomprehensible. Third is that the same arguments and explanations are repeated endlessly as the negotiation progresses. Fourth is when one of the parties involved in the negotiation pretends or states that they cannot attend the next meeting, by giving an acceptable reason and not using unpleasant words or showing signs of dissatisfaction.

Faure then explains that there are several factors that creates the deadlock situation within the negotiation itself, such as process, strategy, and behavioural factors ([Faure, 2005](#)). For the process

factor, it is related to the process within the negotiation, where Faure stated that during negotiations if the concessions between both parties are late or too small, it can damage momentum and have no or even negative impacts on the process. The strategy factor and is related to the strategy of both parties adopt during negotiation. Faure also stated that a deadlocked situation can occur within negotiation due to a direct result of strategies within negotiation dynamics become coercive. The emergence of reciprocity in the form of denial or threats can paralyze the negotiation system and even lock negotiations into a cycle of mutual hostility, with the risk of further conflict escalation. Another factor is the contextual factor, which related to external structures that influence the negotiation situation, which can be social, political, legal, or administrative. This is because, negotiators may be under pressure from peer groups, departments, organizations, or administrative authorities not to give in further.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

History of Russia and Ukraine negotiation to resolve their conflict (2022-2025)

Several days after the invasion, both sides agreed to meet to negotiate an end to the conflict. The first round of negotiation started when President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreed with President of Belarusia named Alexander Lukashenko that delegation from Ukraine will meet with Russia delegation on the border near Belarus ([Zinets, 2022](#)). The talks between both parties began on 28 February, and during the negotiations Ukraine main focus is to get immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Russia forces in Ukraine ([Fischer, 2022](#)). However, at the end of the meetings both parties did not reach any agreement to resolve the conflict but are willing to continue to negotiate. On March 3, 2022 the second round of the negotiations continued, where the two delegations met again on the Belarusian border with Poland. During the negotiations, both sides wanted a possible ceasefire for evacuating civilians and therefore they agreed that they would open a humanitarian corridor for the evacuation of civilians affected by the conflict ([ABC News, 2022](#)). However, regarding the issue to resolve the conflict, the positions of the two countries have not changed. Russia demands consists of demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, independence for area which controlled by separatist groups such as Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as recognition of Crimea as territory belong to Russia. However, Ukraine responded that they do not want to discussed any of these demands before any ceasefire implemented and Russia troops withdraw from its border. Therefore, even as there is no agreement to resolve the conflict, both parties are willing to continue the negotiations ([Aris, 2022](#)).

The third round of negotiations was continued in March 7, 2022, where the delegations from Russia and Ukraine met again to negotiate an agreement to resolving the conflict between the two parties ([Belton, 2022](#)). However, the meeting again did not produce any agreement between the two parties. This happened due to Russia's demands mostly have not changed, namely that Ukraine must change the constitution that guarantees neutrality, accept that Crimea is part of Russia, and recognize that the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are independent state territories. In return, Russia will only halt its military operations in a moment.

The fourth round of negotiations started at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on March 10, 2022 between delegation from Ukraine and Russia. The foreign minister of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba and the Russia counterpart Sergey Lavrov meet with Turkey Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu which stand as mediator ([Butler, 2024](#)). During this meeting, Ukraine is pressing again on ceasefire and resolving humanitarian issues, while the other side Russia keep demanding its guarantees such as neutrality and recognition of Crimea, Donets and Luhansk as independent region. The meeting ended without any agreement between the two parties.

On March 14, 2022, the fifth round of negotiations started where both delegations met via video conference which resulted in the “15-point plan” draft ([Al Jazeera, 2022](#)). Some of the plan included withdrawing Russian troops in Ukraine and the certainty of international military assistance to Ukraine if Russia reactivates its military action, with the guarantee that Ukraine will not join or affiliate with the NATO ([Allison, 2022](#)). Also, for the Crimea issue, Ukraine is offering to discussed the Crimea issue after a concrete ceasefire. Within the draft, Ukraine will also offer to respect the Russian-speaking people in Ukraine cultural sensitivities such as their language rights. However, on March 17, 2022 the negotiations ended with no mutual agreement between the two parties for the 15-point plan draft. Eventhough the negotiation is resumed on March 21, 2022 they still could not produce an agreement on a resolution of the conflict between the two parties which marks the end of the 15-point plan draft discussion.

However, this did not end the negotiation between both parties. The sixth round of negotiations between the delegation from Russia and Ukraine started on March 29, 2022 in Istanbul, Turkey. The result of this meeting was what is known as the “Istanbul Communiqué” ([Anyalebechi & Hart, 2025](#)). Within the communiqué Ukraine would announce itself as a permanently neutral and as a non-nuclear state. Then, Ukraine would not join military alliances such as NATO and not allowing any foreign military bases or troops on Ukraine territory. The communiqué also listed as possible guarantors which include the permanent members of the UN Security Council including Russia, so if Ukraine got attacked and requested assistance, all guarantor states would be obliged to give help in the form of assistance to Ukraine. This communiqué also added that although Ukraine would be permanently neutral under the proposed framework, Ukraine’s path to European Union membership would still be left open. The communiqué also includes that it calls for the two sides to seek to peacefully resolve their dispute over Crimea during the next 15 years.

During this period of negotiation, both Russia and Ukraine were actively exchanging drafts with each other. On April 15, there are several changes that Russia wanted within the Istanbul Communiqué ([Charap & Radchenko, 2024](#)). The first part is that Russia is attempting to change the article where guarantor states can decide independently regarding if they are giving Ukraine help in case of an attack on Ukraine region. For that specific article, Russia demanded that such help can only be allowed after a decision agreed by all the guarantor states including Russia, which makes the have a veto power on such decision. This effort seen by Ukraine side as unacceptable and therefore this attempt is rejected by the Ukraine and keep insisting on the original formula on the article. The second part is that Russia insisting on adding several articles that were not part of the Istanbul Communiqué, such as a requirement for Ukraine to ban any aggressive nationalism or even fascism, nazism and neo-nazism, and even ban on several Ukraine law ([Charap & Radchenko, 2024](#)). The third part is about downsizing the structure of Ukraine military forces,

where both sides remained to have different opinion on the matter. On one side, Ukraine wanted a peacetime army consists of 250,000 people. However, Russia rejecting those demands and keep insisting that Ukraine army only have maximum of 85,000 troops which is considerably smaller than the current standing army Ukraine had before the invasion in 2022. They also have different ideas regarding military equipment such as Tanks, where at first Ukraine wanted to keep around 800 tanks but again Russia denied the demands and countered it with only 342 tanks. Beside tanks, there is also the problem of the range of missiles Ukraine have, where Ukraine wanted to have missiles with around 280 kilometers of range capabilities but Russia only wanted to allow Ukraine to have missiles with 40 kilometers range, which is considerably lower ([Charap & Radchenko, 2024](#)).

However, the talk ended without any agreements between both parties for implementing the Istanbul Communique. This lack of agreements is mostly due to the following disagreements which both parties wont compromised, combining with the knowing of Bucha Massacre by Ukraine on April during negotiation period, and the failed push by the Russia towards Ukraine capital Kyiv. After those incidents, Ukraine now demanded that Russia withdrawal from the Donbas is a requirement for any treaty, which ended the discussion between Russia and Ukraine for the Istanbul Communique ([Charap & Radchenko, 2024](#)).

The meeting can be said to be the last truly substantive negotiation to discuss the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and its resolution to the conflict. After the "Istanbul Communique" discussion was stopped by the two delegations, communication in the negotiations to resolve the conflict can be said to have reached a deadlocked situation. Then in September 2022, the annexation of four Ukrainian regions such as Zaporizhzhia, Luhans, Donetsk, and Kherson by Russia made Zelenskyy states that talks between Russia and Ukraine are currently impossible to achieve and Ukraine still has no desire for direct negotiations with Russia. He even stated that negotiations to resolve the conflict with Russia would not be achieved as long as Russian President Vladimir Putin was still in power ([Harding & Koshiw, 2022](#)). On the other hand, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia had never refused to participate in peace talks with Ukraine and then blamed Ukraine for the failure of previous peace negotiations.

In 2025, the negotiation restarted by both countries to try to resolve the conflict between them. On May 2025 the seventh round of negotiation started when both countries meet in Istanbul, Turkiye since 2022. The meeting happened due to Russia proposal for direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine ([Shamim, 2025](#)). This is a response from a pressure from United States and an ultimatum by the Ukraine and other European countries to Russia to accept 30-day ceasefire unconditionally. Both sides send their proposal to discussed during the negotiation period. Ukraine proposed a peace deal consists of unconditional ceasefire as a necessary requirement for any peace negotiations, ensure that aggression does not happen again, have robust security guarantees, not forced to be neutral, not recognizing territorial gains made by Russia since 2014, and issues regarding any territories are discussed only after ceasefire. Also, regarding sanctions, Ukraine added that some sanctions imposed to Russia may be lifted gradually ([Balmforth & Maclean, 2025](#)). Ukraine then continued by giving a roadmap for peace settlement which started with at least 30 days ceasefire and followed by returning prisoners held by each side and meeting between both presidents of the country.

On the other side, Russia also sends their memorandum to resolve the conflict prior to negotiation. First, is regarding territories where Russia demanded that the region they currently occupied such as Crimea and Donbas region which consists of Kherson, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia is internationally recognized as part of Russia. The second one is regarding citizens of Ukraine that speaks Russian language, where Russia wanted a guarantee that those citizens get the full rights, freedoms, and interests, especially designating Russian language as an official language of Ukraine. Another demand is regarding propaganda, where Russia demand to ban any nazism, neo-nazism, fascism, and added that they wanted to lift any restriction happened within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church ([Barreto & Gormezano, 2025](#)). Russia also insisting again on Ukraine neutrality, where Ukraine must become a neutral state where they will not join any military alliances and ban any foreign military activity within Ukraine. Other demands such as ban on nuclear weapons also added, even though Ukraine currently did not have any nuclear weapon capabilities. Military power also within Russia demand, where they want to limit the strength of Ukraine military capabilities. Lastly is regarding sanction, where Russia demanded to lift all existing sanction imposed into Russia by Ukraine and demanded Ukraine to pledge not to impose any new sanction against them, waiver of claims with Ukraine in connection with damage caused by hostilities between both parties, and restoration of diplomatic and economic relations with Ukraine, which include gas transits.

After this demand, Russia also added two ceasefire option for Ukraine. The first option is for Ukraine to withdraw its army from the four occupied region by Russia ([Barreto & Gormezano, 2025](#)). After the first phase of withdrawal of Ukraine military forces within those regions, a 30-day ceasefire will be established and within those 30 days, full withdrawal must be completed. The second option is more comprehensive than the first one, which consists of banning redeployment of Ukraine armed forces except for withdrawal from the borders of Russia, banning any foreign participations in military operations of Ukraine, removing martial law established by Ukraine since 2022, halting all arms supply and provision of intelligence data to Ukraine from western countries, creating bilateral centre for monitoring ceasefire, and others such as amnesty for political prisoners and military personnel release.

However, in the end the meetings did not produce any substantial agreement between both parties. During the first negotiation started on May 16, both parties only agreed on exchanging 1000 prisoners of war each ([Lukiv & Shevchenko, 2025](#)). The second negotiation that started on June 2, only lasted an hour where they both agreed on exchanging more prisoners of war and return the bodies of 12,000 dead soldiers. However, both parties are unchanging and unwilling to compromise anything regarding their demands for ceasefire or even a framework to end the conflict.

Factors that create a deadlocked situation within Russia and Ukraine negotiation for resolving their conflict

Based on the explanation above regarding the history of their negotiations since 2022, the author finds several patterns than indicate the negotiation between Russia and Ukraine for their conflict resolution is in on a deadlocked situation mostly on the lack of substance and repeated demands

by both parties. First, there is a lack of substance when negotiation between both parties started in 2022 and lasted until 2025. During their negotiation round, there has no significant agreement made between them, which can be seen where the only agreement they achieve is humanitarian corridor, prisoner exchange, and return of soldier bodies to their respective countries. There is also repeated demands made by both parties which can not be fulfilled such as recognition of Crimea from Russia and removal of Russia military forces back to the border before the invasion started from Ukraine. These unchanging demands that are unwilling to be fulfilled by both parties and also lack of any concession regarding effort to resolve the conflict is indicating that their negotiation is now on a deadlocked situation.

After knowing that the negotiation is in a deadlocked situation, we can continue to explaining several factors that appeared within the negotiation that created the deadlock situation. First is the process factor, which correlates to the negotiation process between Russia and Ukraine to resolve their conflict. This factor can be seen through patterns in the negotiation dynamics between both countries which have been explained above. Based on the information mentioned above regarding the negotiation history, here is the table to explains the cycle of negotiation and its results since 2022.

Table 1. Negotiation and the result conducted by Russia and Ukraine since 2022

Date of Negotiation	Discussion	Results
February 27- 28, 2022	Immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Russia forces	No agreement reached
March 3, 2022	Ceasefire for evacuating civilians and possible solution to resolve the conflict	Agreement to open Humanitarian Corridor but no agreement for framework to resolve the conflict
March 7, 2022	Regarding solutions to resolve the conflict	No agreement reached
March 10, 2022	Ceasefire, resolving humanitarian issues, Ukraine neutrality, and recognition of Crimea, Donets and Luhansk as independent region	No Agreement reached
March 14-21, 2022	“15 Point Plan” Draft Discussion	No mutual agreement reached to implement the draft
March 29-30 April, 2022	Istanbul Communique Draft Discussion	No mutual agreement reached to implement the draft
May 15-16, 2025	Exchanging proposals for peace deals	Both parties only agreed on exchanging 1000 prisoners of war each
June 2, 2025	Possible solutions to resolve the conflict	Both agreed on exchanging prisoners of war and return the bodies of 12,000 dead soldiers.

Source: Processed from various sources

From the table, it can be seen that during the ongoing negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, there is lack of concessions between both parties, to achieve any meaningful or possible agreement to resolve the conflict. The concession that mostly agreed upon by both parties is regarding humanitarian corridor and possible exchange for prisoners of war, and also returning dead soldier bodies towards each other sides. The low amount of concession appeared mostly due to both sides unchanging demand since the start of the negotiation in 2022 such as Russia demands Ukraine to withdraw from the region already claimed by Russia military forces and recognize them either as independent countries or as Russia's territory and also demanding Ukraine to stay as a neutral country where they can not join any military alliance, especially NATO and they also demand to limit the military force Ukraine have. On the other side, since the war began Ukraine is not recognizing any claims of territory Russia had since the war started including Crimea region and they also always demanding Russia to withdraw their troops back to the line before the war started and also ask for a security guarantee in case of them being attacked again by Russia. This low amount of concession damages any momentum within the negotiations, stalling them further into more and more stalemate situation where during negotiations both parties can not fulfill any of the demands they have.

Second is strategy factor, which can be seen through strategies both Russia and Ukraine used during negotiations between them regarding the resolution for their conflict since 2022. For Russia, it is apparent that they adopted more aggressive and coercive approach during their negotiations with Ukraine to resolve the conflict. This strategy can be seen through the demands Russia have during ongoing negotiation since 2022, which seems to be expanding and maximizing benefits ([Hynek & Šenk, 2025](#)). At the first few meetings in 2022, Russia demands are regarding Ukraine neutrality and recognition of Crimea. However, as the ongoing conflict goes and Russia slowly started gaining territories from the conflict, Russia added more demands during their next negotiation. Following the failure of the Istanbul Communiqué and Russia's subsequent annexation of four regions, Russian demands in the 2025 negotiations expanded significantly. These demands included the lifting of all sanctions imposed on Russia and a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons. They also encompassed recognition of the four annexed regions, guarantees of rights for Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine, and measures such as banning certain forms of propaganda and removing restrictions on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

On the other side, Ukraine is using more defensive and firm strategy during their negotiations with Russia. Firm, in this case means they have a clear bottom lines which can't be crossed by them such as giving up territories such as Crimea or legitimization of occupied territories, and no compromising sovereignty ([Nychyk & D'Anieri, 2025](#)). Therefore, any demands regarding those are treated by Ukraine as violating their bottom lines and be rejected immediately by them during negotiations. The most concession they can give is only giving more time for discussion regarding territories such as Crimea to be discussed later. On the other hand, Ukraine also adopting defensive strategy during negotiations, which in this case is more survival oriented. Therefore, they always demanded to do ceasefire agreements with Russia during their negotiations. Even on the recent negotiation, Ukraine still wanted to proposed a peace deal consists of unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations. This strategy is used by Ukraine because they want to prevent further loss on their resources and

territories and any ceasefire is an opportune time to rebuild, gather more resource and military aid from other countries especially from Western Europe and United States.

Based on the strategy adopted by both countries during negotiation, it can be seen that those strategies are making the negotiation between them reached a deadlocked situation. Russia often expanded its demands over time such as territorial control, recognition of annexations, neutrality status for Ukraine, and lifting sanctions. This “escalation of demands” approach made compromise within negotiation with Ukraine difficult because each concession by Ukraine would only lead to further demands. Also, expanding these demands aggressively during negotiations and coercively rejecting most demand asked by Ukraine can be seen as a way to control the negotiation, possibly dragging out more time and exhausting Ukraine and its allies. More demands mean more time needed to discussed and with the territory gain everchanging, it gives Russia an advantage for more military operations. This strategy added with military pressure during negotiations makes it even harder for both parties to have concessions, and even blurring the line between genuine negotiations or just stalling tactics by Russia. On the other side, Ukraine strategy also contributes to the deadlock within their negotiations. Ukraine strategy of consistently rejected Russia's annexations and insisted on the full restoration of sovereignty make the negotiation have little room for concessions, since even partial recognition of Russia control of its territories would undermine Ukraine sovereignty.

Lastly is regarding contextual factor, which can be divided into societal, political, and legal sides within the factor itself. First is regarding social, which is the pressure of the citizens from both countries regarding the negotiations. From Ukraine, it can be seen that most people are unwilling to concede territories to Russia. This sentiment is achieved due to the usage of nationalism and group-based moral framings to augment the symbolic value of national territory ([Bachleitner, 2025](#)). According to the survey done by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), which surveys 2,000 respondents across Ukraine-controlled territories in 2025 only around 38% of Ukraine citizens are open to giving up some of the Ukraine territories, which is increasing since 2022 when the war started which only have 8% of Ukrainians agreed ([Fornusek, 2025](#)). However, this still counts as minority of people agreeing to give up some of Ukraine territory and around 60% of Ukrainian are still agreed that Ukraine should not give up any of its territories. For Russia, majority of its citizens are still unwilling to cede or giving up any occupied territories back to Ukraine. According to the survey jointly done by Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) and the Levada Analytical Center (LAC) on late 2024 around 71% oppose any concession to Ukraine by Russia to end the conflict ([Smeltz et al., 2024](#)). However, it should be noted that within this survey it is also stated that 54% of Russia citizens agreed that it is time to negotiate with Ukraine and only 38% agreed to continue military action. Based on these surveys it can be seen that social aspect within both countries is unwilling to give up any concession regarding territories, which pressured negotiations from both countries to have minimum amount of concession to solve the conflict.

From political sides, it can be seen that domestic politics within both countries is constricting the negotiation from both countries to resolve the conflict. Specifically, there are political unwillingness from both Russia and Ukraine to end the war ([Fesenko, 2024](#)). For Russia, Vladimir Putin has framed the war as existential threat, where he stated that going war with Ukraine is to

defend Russia from NATO, “denazifying” Ukraine, and protecting Russian-speaking populations. This resonates with the nationalist community within Russia and any concession such as giving up occupied territories to Ukraine and move back its forces to its pre-war borderlines only going to undermine the support from the groups and risking political backlash towards Putin. Also, for Putin backing down without gains would appear as defeat and will undermine his legitimacy and threatening elite cohesion within Russia. On the other side, Ukraine under Volodymyr Zelenskyy administration, have a stance of no compromise on sovereignty and always rallying on restoring Ukraine borders to before the war started, and even unwilling to recognize Crimea as Russia’s territory. Therefore, any concession by his government, especially giving up its territories would undercut the very foundation of his legitimacy. In August 10, 2025 Volodymyr Zelenskyy still stated that he rejected the idea that his country would give up any territories to end the war ([Kullab & Morton, 2025](#)). Therefore, based on political standpoint within both countries, it can be seen that politics inside both Russia and Ukraine strongly reinforce the deadlock in negotiations because each government faces internal constraints and political imperatives that limit flexibility at the negotiation table.

The last one is legal side which contributes the deadlock within negotiation between Russia and Ukraine to resolve the conflict. First is from Ukraine side and its constitution which created in 1996 defines its borders as those of 1991, after independence from Soviet Union. On article 2, it is explained that the sovereignty of Ukraine shall extend throughout its entire territory, Ukraine shall be a unitary state, and the territory of Ukraine shall be indivisible and inviolable, which meant that that no Ukrainian government can or has the legal authority to give up territory within Ukraine ([Council of Europe, 1996](#)). Also, within article 73 it is stated that any issues of altering the territory of Ukraine are resolved exclusively by an All-Ukrainian referendum, which especially hard to do during war times. From Russia legal side, after 2022 annexation of Ukraine four regions and its subsequent referendum, Russia amended the constitution to include the occupied regions as their own ([dos Reis & Grzybowski, 2024](#)). This meant that making territorial withdrawal legally impossible unless Russia amends its constitution again. Therefore, it can be said that the legal side in the form of constitution from both countries makes it really hard for both parties to manouver during negotiations because neither side can legally concede any territories without amending its own constitutional framework or undertaking mass referendum within the warn torn country.

CONCLUSION

This research highlights that currently negotiation between Russia and Ukraine since 2022 has reached a deadlocked situation. Several indicators found during the negotiations that demonstrate the presence of a deadlock. These include a lack of substantive progress, as neither party reached any agreement on solutions or frameworks for conflict resolution since 2022. The negotiations were further characterized by repeated arguments and recurring demands from both sides. Russia consistently demanded that Ukraine reduce its military capabilities, maintain neutrality, and recognize territories occupied by Russia. Conversely, Ukraine repeatedly called for an immediate ceasefire, security guarantees from Russia and other states, the withdrawal of Russian military

forces to pre-2022 invasion borders, the rejection of Russian territorial claims, and the provision of humanitarian assistance to Ukrainian civilians.

This research also shows that there are several factors that contribute to creating the deadlocked situation within the negotiation. These factors are process, strategy, and contextual. For process factor, which related to the amount of concession happened within the negotiation, it can be seen that negotiation between Russia and Ukraine since 2022 until 2025 have only small concessions which appeared between the two countries. During the ongoing negotiations the most concession they have is only agreeing to open humanitarian corridors, exchanging prisoner of war, and exchanging dead soldier bodies. These lack of concessions not only broke the momentum they have during negotiations, but also halting any developments for any constructive proposals needed to resolve the conflict.

Another factor is regarding strategy, which is related to strategies Russia and Ukraine used during their ongoing negotiation. In this case both strategies used by Russia and Ukraine also contributes to creating the deadlocked situation within the negotiation. On one side, the aggressive and coercive strategies adopted by Russia made the compromise within negotiation with Ukraine difficult and can be seen as a way to control the negotiation, possibly creating more prolonged time for negotiation with Ukraine. On the other side, Ukraine strategy of defensive and firm during their negotiations with Russia is making the negotiation with Russia have little room for concessions.

Last but not least is regarding contextual factors, which consists of social, politics, and legal sides within both countries that affect the negotiation between Russia and Ukraine to resolve their conflict. First is regarding social aspect, where the majority of citizens from both countries are disagreeing to giving up any territories. The other aspect is political, which related to both leader political power that affects the negotiation. In this case, both leaders need to ensure their political hold within their countries which meant that any concession regarding giving up territories will undercut the very foundation of their legitimacy within their government which make negotiations have very limited concessions. The last one is legal aspect, which is related to constitution of both countries. In this case, both countries have constitutions that prevents them to give up any of its territories, be it the territories lost for Ukraine or gained by Russia and therefore any territorial withdrawal from both countries is legally very difficult unless they are agreed to amend their own constitution. The negotiations remain deadlocked because the combination of these three factors blocks any workable conflict resolution framework up to 2025.

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